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COMMENT
Stare Decisis and Secret Law: On Precedent and
Publication in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court
In the wake of the Snowden disclosures, both Congress and the public have
taken a harder look at the work of the courts created by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), focusing in particular on the "secret body of law"1 they
have created in the process of authorizing, modifying, and denying govern-
ment surveillance requests. Numerous commentators have bemoaned both the
FISA courts' secretive nature and the content of specific legal interpretations
revealed in their leaked opinions.2 But an overlooked yet fundamental problem
with the FISA courts' work is that judge-made law can be generated only
through stare decisis, a doctrine that we argue is not justified when applied to
secret opinions of the type the FISA courts produce. As a result, we conclude
that the FISA courts should either publish all opinions that are precedential or
cease writing precedential opinions at all.
This Comment joins other work in arguing that the legitimacy of stare de-
cisis depends upon widespread publication.4 The doctrine of stare decisis itself
1. Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A., N.Y. TiMEs, July
6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2o13/o7/o7/us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadens-powers-of
-nsa.html [http ://perma.cc/FAQ3-LETOJ.
2. See, e.g., Nadia Kayyali, What You Need To Know About the FISA Court-and How It Needs To
Change, ELEc. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2o14/o8
/what-you-need-know-about-fisa-court-and-how-it-needs-change [http://perma.ccY3XU
-8AT 7 ].
3. Simply put, judicial opinions "make law" when judges are bound by the doctrine of stare
decisis to follow these opinions' reasoning in later cases. See infra Part II.A.
4. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the
Declining Use of Opinions To Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 757, 770 (1995) ("Published opinions that state the facts and the reasoning
upon which decisions rest are essential to the operation of stare decisis .... "); William M.
Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions: A
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emerged only with the consistent and reliable publication of court opinions,'
and legal processes that do not result in the issuance of publicly available opin-
ions, such as settlements and arbitrations, generally lack stare decisis norms al-
together.6 Although previous scholarship has discussed the proper role of stare
decisis in the context of "unpublished" opinions 7 which make up around
eighty percent of all United States courts of appeals opinions 8 (and are usually
publicly available despite their name), 9 this Comment provides the first exami-
nation of the tenability of stare decisis as applied to truly secret opinions like
those of the FISC. Many have noted that stare decisis typically comes with both
costs and benefits. But, we argue, in the absence of publication these costs are
exacerbated and the benefits are substantially reduced. Therefore, without
publication, stare decisis becomes harder to justify and should be avoided
when it comes to truly secret opinions of the type the FISA courts produce.
Part I provides general background on the FISA courts and examines when
and how they generate binding precedent. Part II proceeds by discussing the
nature of stare decisis: its central role in creating judge-made law and its costs
and justifications, particularly as applied to secret opinions. We ultimately de-
termine that FISA judges should either label an opinion as binding precedent
and publish it or mark the opinion as non-precedential and retain discretion
not to publish it. Part III concludes with concrete recommendations for im-
plementing our suggestions in the FISA courts.
Critique, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 314 (1985) ("The development of 'hidden' precedents mocks
the concept of stare decisis ....").
s. See Dragich, supra note 4, at 770-75; Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis:
The Critical Years, 18oo to 185o, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 34-36 (1959).
6. See J. Kirkland Grant, Securities Arbitration: Is Required Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 24 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 389, 412 (1989) ("[A] rbitrators are not bound by stare decisis and need not jus-
tify or explain their decisions."); Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settle-
ment, and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 221
(1999) ("A judicial precedent requires not only an aggrieved party who files a lawsuit, but
also that the case goes to trial, and perhaps appeal, without a settlement.").
7. See sources supra note 4; see also Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F. 3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated
as moot on rehg en banc, 235 F.3 d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (leaving open whether no-citation
rules for unpublished opinions are unconstitutional).
8. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 39
tbl. S3 (2002).
9. These are generally available on the court website. See, e.g., Opinions and Orders, U.S. CT.
APPEALS FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions-orders [http://perma.cc
/9P5J-PPRY]. They are also published in the Federal Appendix. See Federal Appendix (Na-
tional Reporter System), THOMSON REUTERS, http:/Aegalsolutions.thomsonreuters.con/law
-products/Reporters/Federal-Appendix-National-Reporter-System/p/ooooo796 [http://
perma.cc/3YAA-FYX 3] ("This product covers opinions and decisions ... issued by the U.S.
courts of appeals that are not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter.").
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I. PRECEDENT IN THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
COURTS
A. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, enacted in 1978,0 sets up the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a specialized Article III court
with the power to hear and grant government requests for foreign surveil-
lance." The FISC's work consists almost entirely of ex parte proceedings grant-
ing, modifying, and denying government requests for the authority to conduct
surveillance or searches, or to compel the production of tangible things. 2
Pursuant to the statute, the FISC consists of eleven Article III district court
judges, selected by the Chief Justice of the United States. 3 All applications are
considered by a single judge and cannot be reheard by another judge of the
FISC except when the court sits en banc.4 FISA provides for both en banc con-
sideration and appeals to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
(Court of Review). En banc review involves a panel of all eleven FISC judges
and must be ordered by a majority of the FISC judges based on a determina-
tion that "(i) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uni-
formity of the court's decisions; or (ii) the proceeding involves a question of
exceptional importance."'" According to public records, the FISC has sat en
banc only once, 6 but it is impossible to know how many sittings and opinions
remain secret. The Court of Review, which consists of three district or circuit
judges also designated by the Chief Justice, has issued only two public deci-
sions. 7
lo. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783.
11. 50 U.S.C. § 18o3(a)(i) (2012).
12. In re Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 488 (FISA Ct. 2007); ANDREw NOLANq
& RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43362, REFORM OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS: PROCEDURAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGES 2 (2014),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43362.pdf [https ://perma.cc/2U92-YMPU].
13. 50 U.S.C. § 18o3(a)(1) (2012).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 18o3(a)(2)(A).
16. See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d 611 (FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed Case, 310 F. 3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
17. Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, PRIVACY & C.L.
OVERSIGHT BOARD 14 (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report on-the
TelephoneRecordsProgram.pdf [http://perma.cc/3KY2-6QUA]; see In re Directives [re-
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B. Stare Decisis and the FISA Courts
In terms of its core function, the FISC is effectively a federal district court.
8
The vast majority of its work involves a single judge's determinations of the le-
gality of government requests to authorize surveillance or compel production.
Although it is hard to be certain without more publicly available information,
FISC judges likely treat their opinions as non-precedential, as is standard prac-
tice for federal district courts.' 9 The relatively few public FISC opinions do cite
earlier FISC opinions and principles of law,' but we have seen no clear evi-
dence to suggest that the judges feel formally bound by those earlier opinions in
any manner that would set them apart from other Article III district courts.
In contrast, en banc opinions and Court of Review opinions apparently do
have the force of stare decisis. With en banc rulings, this point is evident from
the statute: the court may sit en banc only to "secure or maintain uniformity"
or to decide a "question of exceptional importance."' These bases for en banc
jurisdiction suggest that individual FISC judges must give stare decisis effect to
any en banc panel decision that is not overturned by the Court of Review be-
cause, absent such a practice, the en banc panels would not fulfill one of their
two statutory purposes: to secure or maintain uniformity.
Court of Review opinions can be precedential, but they are not necessarily
precedential. The Court of Review is an appellate court, and like other Article
III appellate courts, it has the power to bind both lower courts (in this case, the
FISC) and later Court of Review panels. ' The Court of Review probably has
the same discretion as federal courts of appeals to designate opinions as prece-
dacted text] Pursuant to Section 1osB of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d
1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); In re Sealed Case, 31o F.3d 717.
18. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things, No. BR 13-158 (FISA Ct. 2013), at 2 n.2, http://www.uscourts
.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-158-Memorandum-131218.pdf [http ://perma.cc/FB34-VEQL]
("Although [the FISC] is not a district court, it possesses similar inherent authority, except
to the extent that it is limited by FISA.").
ig. See Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEv. L.J. 787,
800-04 (2012).
20. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requesting the Prod. of Tangible Things
From [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 12 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (citing a previous FISC opin-
ion: "See In Re Production of Tangible Things From [RedactedJ, Docket No. BR o8-13, Supp.
Op. (Dec. 12, 2008) (discussing Section 215 and Section 2703)"), http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-o9-primary-order.pdf [http ://perma.cc/A9TV-6887].
21. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2) (A) (2012).
22. However, since the Court of Review always effectively sits en banc -there are only three
judges on the court at any given time, and they always sit as a panel of three -the binding
effect of opinions on later Court of Review panels is likely more informal than formal.
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dential and non-precedential; at least, no statutory provision declares other-
wise.23 The two public Court of Review opinions are published in redacted
form in the Federal Reporter. 4 As with the published case of the FISC sitting
en banc, these published Court of Review cases are certainly precedential. s We
do not know the volume, if any, of secret non-precedential Court of Review
opinions, or whether there are non-public Court of Review opinions that are
nonetheless treated as precedential.
As we have demonstrated in this Part, the FISA courts currently generate at
least some amount of formally binding precedent that they are under no legal
obligation to publish. 6 In Part II, we take up the task of determining whether
the justifications for the doctrine of stare decisis support affording secret opin-
ions of this type binding precedential force. We conclude, ultimately, that they
do not.
II. STARE DECISIS AND SECRET LAW
Judges' power to bind future judges to the reasoning and interpretations of
law advanced in their opinions comes from the doctrine of stare decisis, 7 Latin
for "to stand by decided matters. '" Stare decisis can operate either horizontal-
ly, by binding other judges on the issuing court, or vertically, by binding judg-
23. The Order establishing the rules for the Court of Review states: "Except as otherwise pro-
vided herein, or by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, (92 Star. 1783 et seq.),
the statutes and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure prescribing the jurisdiction, authority
and procedures of the United States Courts of Appeal shall apply mutatis mutandis to
this Court." FISA CT. R. 5 (1980), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fiscr-rules.pdf
[http ://perma.cc/HG7P-TSWC].
24. See In re Directives Pursuant to Section 1o5B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551
F.3 d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); In re Sealed Case, 31o F. 3 d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
25. See Orin Kerr, Hints and Questions About the Secret Fourth Amendment Rulings of
the FISA Court, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 7, 2013, 1:37 AM), http://volokh.com/2o13
/o7/o7/hints-and-questions-about-the-secret-fourth-amendment-ruings-of-the-fisa-court
[http://perma.cc/YLH 4 -8Q8Y] ("It's just the FISC following the FIS Court of Review to
which it is bound under principles of vertical stare decisis.").
26. The published opinions currently available may constitute the entire work of the Court of
Review- that is, there may in fact be no extant unpublished precedential opinions from the
Court of Review or the en banc FISC, but the current legal regime does allow for such opin-
ions to exist.
27. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 57-58 (1921) ("Stare
decisis is at least the everyday working rule of our law.... [A judge makes law through issu-
ing opinions because] in fashioning [the law for the parties to a case], he will be fashioning
it for others.").
z8. Stare Decisis, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/stare%2odecisis [http://perma.cc/9VZ9-QFXZ].
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es at lower levels of the judicial hierarchy. 9 Stare decisis gives a panel of judges
the power to make law within any jurisdiction where they have horizontal or
vertical stare decisis authority, because judges in that jurisdiction will be obli-
gated to respect precedent even when they would otherwise be inclined to rea-
son differently.
A. The Costs of Stare Decisis in the FISA Context
The benefits of and justifications for stare decisis are discussed in the next
Part, but it is important to establish as an initial matter that stare decisis also
involves serious costs, which are exacerbated by the FISA courts' secrecy and
institutional context.
Stare decisis's most prominent cost is binding judges to interpretations of
law that they find unpersuasive, raising the fundamental question of when and
why such a restraint on judges' decision-making autonomy is justified." In an
ideal world, stare decisis would insulate valid principles of law from arbitrary
and unprincipled revision without entrenching "bad" precedent against further
review.31 In reality, stare decisis hinders defection from both appealing and un-
appealing precedent.
This cost of stare decisis is heightened in the secret law context, because
the incentive to invest extra effort in writing opinions is less powerful without
the promise, and constraints, of public scrutiny.3" The general principle, evi-
denced by the congressional testimony of Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Cir-
cuit, 3 is that publication induces judges to write more thorough, carefully rea-
soned opinions. Secrecy deprives FISA court judges of helpful external
29. See, e.g., Mead, supra note 19, at 8oo.
30. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REv. 1
(2001).
31. See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare
Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2034 (1996) (arguing that "stare decisis has the potential to im-
port injustice irremediably into the law").
32. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 196o Term -Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961) (outlining a theory of Supreme Court jurisprudence based ex-
plicitly on the political constraints facing the Court); Christopher J. Casillas et al., How Pub-
lic Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court, 55 AM. J. POL. SCL 74 (2011).
33. See Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo7th Cong. 14 (2002) (statement of J.
Alex Kozinski, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) ("The time -often a
huge amount of time -that judges spend calibrating and polishing opinions need not be
spent in cases decided by an unpublished disposition that is intended for the parties
alone.").
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feedback from scholars,' the public, and Congress. Because secrecy reduces
judges' incentives and ability to make good precedent, the risk of entrenching
bad precedent is unusually high in the context of the FISA courts.
Moreover, doctrinal entrenchment is particularly problematic in the FISA
courts, where secrecy and institutional context indicate that outside efforts at
doctrinal reform are less likely to be effective than they are with courts that
publish their opinions." Unlike published opinions, secret opinions cannot
provoke the public into lobbying for a legislative override 6 or judicial overrul-
ing 7 - two important paths of legal reform."' Perhaps to hedge against the
risks of limited external oversight, FISA limits FISC and Court of Review
judges to non-renewable, seven-year terms,39 a provision suggesting that Con-
gress envisioned a FISA court whose membership would be responsive to shift-
ing factual circumstances and policy priorities.4" Stare decisis, which requires
judges to adhere to interpretations of law that they might otherwise reject as
unjust or unpersuasive, constrains these judges' ability to adapt to such factual
and policy shifts. Consequently, doctrinal entrenchment, by undermining
FISA's statutory design and cramping efforts at reform from within, further
exacerbates the costs of stare decisis in the FISA context.
34. See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, Law Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the Twenty-First Century Su-
preme Court Justices: An Empirical Analysis, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 399 (2012) (discussing citations
of law review articles by the Supreme Court).
35. Since the contents of secret opinions are not widely available, it is difficult for the general
public even to know whether doctrinal reform is necessary.
36. For a history of congressional overrides of Supreme Court opinions, see Matthew R. Chris-
tiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Inter-
pretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REv. 1317 (2014).
37. For a famous example of public outrage leading to a judicial overruling, see Robert A. Burt,
Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 8S MICH. L. REv. 1741 (1987)
(discussing the role public outrage and state-level legislative action had on the Supreme
Court's 1976 overruling of a 1972 opinion banning capital punishment).
38. Letter from Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, U.S. Senators, to Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (Mar. 15, 2012) https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/325953-85512347-senators
-ron-wyden-mark-udall-letter-to.html [https://perma.cc/4YTS-4669] ("[I]t is impossible
to have an informed public debate about what the law should say when the public doesn't
know what its government thinks the law says.").
39. 50 U.S.C. § 18o 3(d) (2012).
40. This tenure restriction limits any single judge's influence over the FISA courts' long-term
development. Granting secret opinions stare decisis power undermines the goals embodied
in this limitation by preferring earlier iterations of the FISA courts over later ones, perhaps
thereby restricting the ability of the Chief Justice to reshape the relevant law through trans-
formative appointments. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, loi HAPV. L.
REv. 1164 (1988) (detailing the concept and historical use of transformative judicial ap-
pointments).
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B. The Inapplicability of Stare Decisis Rationales to Secret Opinions
Defenses of stare decisis usually fall into one of three categories: 1) it pro-
motes the rule of law; 4' 2) it promotes the appearance of the rule of law; 42 or 3)
it expresses judicial deference to the legislative branch by allowing Congress to
correct interpretations of law it finds faulty. 43 A closer examination of each of
these justifications reveals their basic inapplicability to secret opinions.
The most common and forceful justification for stare decisis is that it pro-
motes stability in the rule of law,' holding judges accountable to the public
and keeping them from acting capriciously.4' By promising fidelity to past
statements of law, stare decisis "keep[s] the law standardized so it may be
knowable to all .... ,46 It also helps to guarantee consistency in adjudication by
limiting judicial discretion and ensuring that "like cases be decided alike."47 Be-
cause stare decisis makes the law consistent and knowable, this doctrine invites
public reliance on judicial pronouncements.48
But these rule of law justifications for stare decisis largely wither when de-
prived of the sunlight publication provides. As discussed above, lack of publici-
ty creates an increased risk of entrenching bad precedent and reduces incentives
for judges to do their most careful work,49 thereby undermining the ability of
stare decisis to promote the rule of law. Though it will not necessarily act ca-
priciously or incautiously absent public scrutiny, a court is not constrained by a
public that cannot access its opinions.
To be sure, the rule of law justifications for stare decisis do not entirely dis-
appear when applied to secret opinions: intelligence agencies do have a consid-
41. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
44. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 720 (199S) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The
principle of stare decisis is designed to promote stability and certainty in the law.").
45. See, e.g., Eubank Heights Apartments, Ltd. v. Lebow, 669 F.2d 20, 23 n.2 (ist Cir. 1982)
("Stare decisis imposes very substantial constraints upon this court's willingness to depart
from previously adjudicated decisions."); William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L.
REV. 735, 736 (1949) ("Stare decisis serves to take the capricious element out of law and to
give stability to a society.").
46. Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REv. 409, 413
(1924).
47. See, e.g., Phillips v. Vasquez, 56 F.3 d 1030, 1039 (9 th Cir. 1995) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
48. See Michael C. Doff, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2028 (1994) ("[R]eliance
interests often tip the balance in favor of retaining a rule of law that might otherwise be
overturned.").
49. See supra Part II.A.
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erable reliance interest in FISA courts' opinions, and stare decisis does help
guarantee that like cases are decided alike. The NSA and FBI are aware of and
reliant on prior dispositions of the FISA courtss0 that the American public can
neither know about nor rely upon. But stare decisis may not be a necessary
condition for at least partially realizing that benefit. Even absent any formal
stare decisis norm, courts tend to preserve significant consistency in their opin-
ions because of the persuasive value of past decisions, awareness of the costs of
disrupting established programs, and the fact that courts are repeat decision
makers.5 ' There is no reason to suppose the FISA courts would act differently.
Stare decisis is also defended on the ground that it increases the "perceived
integrity of the judicial process" by promoting the appearance of the rule of
law. 2 When courts cavalierly overrule their own precedent, they may reduce
the public's confidence in the view that judges are constrained by the principles
of law they espouse. s3 However, granting binding precedential value to secret
opinions fails to promote the appearance of the rule of law, precisely because
these opinions are secret. It is impossible for the public to ascertain the analyti-
cal coherence of secret opinions or the frequency with which they overrule past
interpretations. As demonstrated by the public outrage at the perception that
the FISA courts have created a secret body of judicial precedent, s4 denying the
5o. As is typical in warrant applications, only the government party seeking the warrant is al-
lowed to attend most FISC proceedings, since including the party the warrant is sought
against would often defeat the purpose of the application itself. However, calls for a "public
advocate" to be introduced into FISC proceedings have been made by a number of
political figures, including President Obama. See Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller,
Obama Calls for Significant Changes in Collection of Phone Records of U.S. Citizens, WASH.
POST, Jan. 17, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-speech-obama-to-call-for
-restructuring-of-nsas-surveillance-program/214/l/17/e9d5a8ba-7f6e-ne3-95c6-oa7aa8o8
74bc.story.html [http://perma.cc/4XB4-LVCM] ("Obama also called on Congress to estab-
lish a panel of public advocates who can represent privacy interests before the FISC, which
hears government applications for surveillance in secret.").
si. See generally NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT (2oo8) (providing
a detailed explication of the many ways "precedent" can and should influence and govern
decision making through both formal institutional channels and cognitive processes).
52. Payne v. Tennessee, 5o U.S. 808, 827 (1991) ("Stare decisis is the preferred course because it
... contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." (emphasis add-
ed)); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986) ("[S]tare decisis ... contributes to the
integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact." (em-
phasis added)).
53. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 50
(1976) ("[Overruling precedent] undermine[s] the belief that judges are not unrestrainedly
asserting their individual or collective wills, but following a law which binds them as well as
the litigants.").
s4. See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Do Surveillance Court's Secret Rulings Violate U.S. Constitution?,
REUTERS: ON THE CASE (July 8, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2o3
2197
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
force of stare decisis to secret opinions may promote the appearance of the rule
of law better than the status quo does, by limiting the reach and legal impact of
the FISA courts' secret rulings.
Finally, courts invoke stare decisis to defer to tacit legislative assent; in oth-
er words, courts sometimes interpret legislative silence as a sign that Congress
has acquiesced to standing precedent."s Stare decisis is therefore observed most
scrupulously in matters of statutory construction-since the legislature is "free
to change [an] interpretation of its legislation" s6 - and observed most leniently
in the arena of constitutional adjudication, where judicial opinions can be over-
turned only by courts themselves or through constitutional amendment.'
This final defense for stare decisis is severely weakened when applied to se-
cret opinions. The legislature is not always given access to secret opinions of
the FISA courts,s8 and even when it is, secret opinions cannot generate the type
of public pressure frequently necessary to spur legislative correction. Gag or-
ders are sometimes issued pursuant to programs authorized by the FISA
courts, further stifling public discussion and oversight by the parties most di-
rectly affected."s Even members of Congress face significant obstacles to speak-




S5. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972) ("If there is any inconsistency or illogic in [observ-
ing stare decisis in this case], it is . . . to be remedied by the Congress and not by this
Court.").
56. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
57. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) ("The doctrine of stare decisis... is at
its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered on-
ly by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions.").
58. Only select members of Congress are given access to FISC opinions. Letter from Reggie
B. Walton, Presiding Judge, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to Dianne
Feinstein, U.S. Senator i (Mar. 27, 2013) http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf
/opinion/Feinsteinletter.pdf [http://perma.cc/DU3G-J7BS] ("[T]he Executive Branch pro-
vides the [Senate] Intelligence and Judiciary Committees with all significant FISC opinions,
albeit in classified form.").
59. See, e.g., Craig Timberg & Cecilia Kang, Google Challenges U.S. Gag Order, Citing
First Amendment, WASH. POST, June 18, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/technology/google-challenges-us-gag-order-citing-first-amendment/2ol3/o6/8/96835c72
-d832-Ile2-a9f2-42ee3912aoe-story.html [http://perma.cc/D893-N4W6].
60. See, e.g., Sen. Ron Wyden & Sen. Mark Udall, How Can Congress Debate a Secret Law?,
HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (May 25, 2011, 1:56 P.M.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sen
-ron-wyderVhow-can-congress-debate-a b86692o.html [http://perma.cc/XK53-UY2C].
Though revealing classified information on the floor in either house would likely have seri-
ous consequences internally in terms of committee assignments and the member's relation-
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Granting stare decisis value to secret opinions threatens to entrench legal
precedent that has not been subjected to the many direct and indirect benefits
of public scrutiny. These problems overpower the residual benefits stare decisis
may provide in the context of secret opinions. Taken together, the analysis in
this Comment suggests that the justifications most commonly offered in de-
fense of stare decisis- rule of law, appearance of the rule of law, and deference
to legislative authority - do not support affording binding precedential value to
secret opinions of the kind sometimes issued by the FISA courts."
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Because the theoretical justifications for stare decisis depend largely on
publication, the FISA courts should publish any opinion that they consider
binding precedent. The courts could retain discretion over whether to publish
opinions not treated as binding on future judges.62 Therefore, every preceden-
tial opinion of the Court of Review and every FISC en banc opinion should be
published in redacted form. On the other hand, the need to publish the ordi-
nary work of the FISC is not as urgent, at least not for the reasons explored in
this Comment.6 3
ship with leadership, members of Congress are protected by the Constitution's Speech and
Debate Clause and cannot be prosecuted for statements made on the floor of either house.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972).
61. One important counterargument against our concern with the role of stare decisis in gener-
ating secret judge-made law is that other governmental bodies make law in secret, apparent-
ly without the theoretical problems we have identified here. For example, secret executive
orders and secret opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) can contain interpretations
of law that are in many ways as binding within the executive branch as judicial pronounce-
ments are. While this may be a comparison worth further explication elsewhere, the law-
making function of Article III courts differs in myriad ways from the lawmaking function of
the executive branch, where stare decisis norms do not play the same role in generating law.
Most obviously, the fundamental source of the Executive's legal authority is Article II rather
than Article III, and the traditions and constitutional delegation of powers to each respective
branch varies tremendously. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2, with id. art. I, §§ 1, 8; id.
art. II, §§ 1-3. Ultimately, however, the theoretical foundation of secret law in non-judicial
contexts is a broader question and falls outside the scope of this Comment.
62. To be clear, it is not our project to engage with the broader debate over the legitimacy of the
FISA courts' ability to decide cases in secret. Consequently, we neither endorse nor preclude
the possibility that all decisions of the FISA courts should be published for reasons unrelat-
ed to stare decisis - our exclusive concern here.
63. To the extent that there are de facto precedential legal interpretations in the FISA courts,
other public legitimacy rationales might support en banc consideration and publication, but
we do not address those rationales here.
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In the absence of publication, the FISC judges should afford no formal def-
erence to past interpretations - even the opinions of the Court of Review or the
en banc FISC. Though this recommendation might seem surprising, it emerges
from this Comment's conclusion that granting the force of stare decisis to se-
cret opinions is unjustified at the theoretical level.
It is possible for publication of precedential materials to be achieved simply
as a matter of discretion: the executive branch may release these opinions,64 as
may the authoring judge of any opinion. 61 But the best option, because it limits
the ability ofjudges and executive branch officials to make additional judgment
calls about disclosure, is for Congress to demand publication of such opinions
by amending FISA. Under this recommendation, the Court of Review would
retain its discretion to write non-precedential or precedential opinions as the
situation requires, but FISA would demand the publication of all binding prec-
edent. One of the many proposals for FISA court reform involves a version of
this requirement: Senate Bill 1467 would require the FISA courts to release any
opinions containing a "significant construction or interpretation of law., 66 We
endorse this proposal but would define "significant constructions" of law as
those that will have the force of stare decisis.
Some will undoubtedly claim that any increase in the level of FISA court
publication, even with redaction, is inconsistent with protecting national secu-
rity. Another worry is that, even with publication of opinions, the necessary re-
dactions may severely inhibit the public value of those opinions to the point
that publication is pointless. 67 Such predictions are difficult to assess, but if the
additional public understanding created by the release of past FISA court opin-
ions is any guide,68 the release of future opinions will likely continue to spur
thoughtful commentary and enhance public understanding of the law.
This Comment has described a theoretical problem with secret precedential
opinions and applied this framework to the FISA courts. We recognize that
some may object to this proposal on the grounds that it fails to acknowledge
64. JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43 4 04, DISCLOSURE OF FISA OPINIONS -SELECT
LEGAL ISSUES, 4 (2o14), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R434o4.pdf [http://perma.cc
/R4YZ-788A].
65. Id. at 3.
66. S. 1467, 1i3th Cong. 5 6 (2013).
67. Concerns about redaction have been raised by FISA court judges themselves. See Letter from
Reggie B. Walton to Dianne Feinstein, supra note 58, at 2 ("[I]n most cases, the facts and
the legal analysis are so inextricably intertwined that excising the classified information
from the FISC's analysis would result in a remnant void of much or any useful meaning.").
68. See, e.g., David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of the FISA Wall, 17 STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 487, 513-
18 (20o6) (discussing, based on its published opinion, the Court of Review's analysis of the
PATRIOT Act).
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pressing security needs. However, we advocate a middle path between univer-
sal publication and the status quo of near-total secrecy. We hope that publica-
tion will induce FISA court judges to write precedential opinions with the same
eye to public scrutiny that they apply in carrying out their other jobs as district
and circuit court judges. More broadly, we hope to have drawn much-needed
attention to the problem of applying stare decisis in secret courts.
JACK BOEGLIN & JULIUS TARANTO.
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* We are grateful to Jack Balkin, William Eskridge, Jonathan Manes, Zayn Siddique, and
Richard Taranto for conversations and insights that enriched this project, and to Sean Aren-
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